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Abstract: 
Many developing countries have increased their foreign reserve stocks dramatically in recent 
years, in large part motivated by the desire for precautionary self-insurance.  One of the negative 
consequences of large accumulations for these countries is the risk of valuation losses. In this 
paper we examine the implications of systematic reserve decumulation by the Czech authorities 
aimed at mitigating valuation losses on euro-denominated assets. The policy was explicitly not 
intended to influence the value of the koruna relative to the euro. Initially the timing and size of 
reserve sales was not predictable, eventually sales occurred on a daily basis (in three equal 
installments within the day).  This project examines whether these reserve sales, both during the 
regime of discretionary timing as well as when sales occurred every day, had unintended 
consequences for the domestic currency.  Our findings using intraday exchange rate data and 
time-stamped reserve sales indicate that when decumulation occurred every day these sales led to 
significant appreciation of the koruna.  Overall, our results suggest that the manner in which 
reserve sales are carried out matters for whether reserve decumulation influences the relative 
value of the domestic currency. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 China’s official foreign exchange reserves hit $2.4 trillion in early 2010. 
Although China is currently the country with the largest foreign reserve accumulation, 
reserves have risen dramatically for many emerging market countries in recent years.   A 
number of studies have attempted to understand the motives for reserve accumulation, as 
well as the costs and benefits of reserve stocks.1
 The Czech Republic became an independent state in January 1993 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union.  A decade later, in May 2004, it officially 
joined the European Union with a view toward eventually giving up the Czech Koruna 
(CZK) and joining the euro-zone.
  In this paper we examine what happens 
when a country decides to reduce its foreign reserve holdings.  While reserve 
accumulation in some countries is thought to be the byproduct of a government strategy 
to keep the international value of the domestic currency low in order to boost export 
growth, does it follow that reserve decumulation leads to domestic currency appreciation?  
We test this hypothesis using unique intraday data on recent euro-denominated reserve 
sales by the Czech National Bank (CNB). 
2  Although the Czech Republic has yet to join the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), a pre-condition for joining the euro-
zone3, the CNB intervened frequently in the CZK-EUR market through September 2002.4
                                                 
1 See Jeanne (2007) and Dominguez (2010). 
  
2 The Czech koruna (or crown) has been the currency of the Czech Republic since 8 February 1993 when it 
replaced the Czechoslovak koruna at par. The Czech Republic planned to adopt the euro in 2012, but its 
government suspended that plan in 2007. 
3 The Danish krone has been in the ERM II since the launch of the euro in 1999; the Estonian kroon, 
Lithuanian litas, and Slovenian tolar were included on 28 June 2004; the Cypriot pound, the Latvian lats 
and the Maltese lira on 2 May 2005; and the Slovak koruna on 28 November 2005.The currencies of the 
three largest countries which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 (the Polish zloty, the Czech 
koruna, and the Hungarian forint) are expected to follow eventually. Slovenia joined the euro-zone in 2007, 
Cyprus and Malta joined in 2008, and Slovakia joined in 2009. 
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Throughout this period the CNB was largely engaged in leaning-against-the-wind 
operations to slow down the steady appreciation of the koruna relative to the euro (over 
the period 1999 through September 2002 the koruna appreciated by over 25% against the 
euro).   The koruna abruptly reversed direction in the fall of 2002, and depreciated 
relative to the euro through early 2004 (during which time the CNB ceased intervening).  
In April 2004, as the koruna again began to appreciate against the euro, the CNB 
announced that it would begin to sell some its euro-denominated reserves. At that time, 
the euro value of its foreign reserve holdings was €21.9 billion (or $26.3b).  The apparent 
rationale for the policy of reserve decumulation was to reduce the valuation losses that 
followed from the fact that Czech reserves are largely denominated in euros, the value of 
which was falling relative to the koruna.  At the same time, the CNB was explicit in not 
wanting to influence, and in particular further appreciate, the koruna relative to the euro.5
The CNB decision to sell euro-denominated reserves starting in 2004 seems 
to have been well understood by market participants, but the timing and size of sales was 
not pre-announced. In June 2007 the CNB changed its discretionary approach to reserve 
sales; from this point on it sold €3m on a daily basis (in three equal installments within 
the day) through the end our data sample in November 2007.
 
6
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The CNB intervened on 1,247 occasions over the period 1997 through September 2002.  See Disyatat and 
Galati (2007), Egert and Komarek (2006), Gersl and Holub (2006), and Scalia (2008) for analyses of these 
operations. 
   This project examines 
whether these CNB reserve sales, both during the regime of discretionary timing as well 
as when sales occurred every day, had unintended consequences.  We specifically test 
5 See IMF Country Report No. 04/266 ( http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04266.pdf ) which states 
that the CNB recent decision to begin selling reserves was aimed solely at limiting further accumulation of 
reserves and “was not intended to influence the level of the exchange rate” (page 12). 
6 The daily sales amount of €3m is consistent with what can be inferred from the publicly available CNB 




whether these euro-denominated reserve sales influenced the CZK-EUR rate, while 
controlling for other factors that may have affected the relative value of the koruna.7
Our results suggest that over the full sample period, and the first 
(discretionary) regime, there is little evidence that euro reserve sales influenced the 
koruna.  However, the decumulation in 2007, when the CNB sold euros every business 
day, led to a statistically significant appreciation of the koruna relative to the euro.   
 
This finding that rules-based reserve sales lead to the relative appreciation 
of the domestic currency is surprising and intriguing.  Economic theory generally 
suggests that “expected” policies are less likely to influence asset prices than 
“unexpected” ones.8  Yet it is during the regime in which the CNB sold reserves every 
day that the sales seem to have influenced the value of the koruna.9  The results are also 
surprising in the context of the intervention literature. It remains controversial whether 
traditional foreign exchange interventions operations, which are generally intended to 
influence currency values, are able to do so.10
                                                 
7 The CNB has followed an inflation-targeting monetary regime since 1998.  Actual Czech inflation 
generally kept well within its target range over our sample period (the CNB inflation target band was 3-5% 
in 2004, 2-4% in 2005, 3% in 2006 and 2% in March 2007).  It is generally the case that countries that 
effectively target inflation sterilize their foreign currency operations.  In the CNB case, sales of foreign 
reserves, if not sterilized with a matching increase in domestic assets, would result in a decrease in the 
monetary base.  Our empirical specification controls for the possibility that reserve sales are not sterilized 
by including Czech short-term interest rates. 
  In this case reserve sales were explicitly 
not intended as interventions in currency markets, but our results nonetheless suggest 
they did have an influence. 
8 See for example, Sargent and Wallace (1975) who show that if expectations are formed rationally (and 
there are no other sources of stickiness in the price mechanism) anticipated policies should have no real 
effects. 
9 Although reserves sales occurred every day it is worth noting that market participants at the time did not 
know whether this regime would continue indefinitely, as a consequence the sales can’t be considered 
perfectly anticipated.  
10 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Dominguez (2006), Dominguez and Panthaki (2007), Fatum and 
Pedersen (2009), Fatum (2008) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005) for discussions of the efficacy of 
traditional intervention policy. 
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This study examines the effects of Czech National Bank sales of euro-
denominated reserves on the koruna.  In the next section we describe the institutional 
context in which the Czech authorities decided to decumulate their foreign reserves.  In 
section 3 we detail the intra-day data that we use to test the hypothesis that reserve 
decumulation leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency.   Section 4 describes the 
econometric methodology that we use to take into account the seasonal features of intra-
day exchange rate movements and section 5 provides estimation results from regressions 
of CZK-EUR returns on CNB reserve sales.  Section 6 provides robustness checks and 
our conclusions are in section 7. 
2.  Institutional Aspects of CNB Reserve Sales 
 
Figure 1 shows that Czech reserve holdings during our sample period were 
high relative to other emerging market countries with similar per capita GDP.  However, 
if we compare Czech reserve holdings to other Eastern European countries and Russia 
(figure 2); they are closer to the median, well below Poland and Russia, but higher than 
Hungary and Bulgaria.  At the end of 2007, foreign exchange reserves represented 
approximately 83% of the CNB’s assets, 57.4% were denominated in euros, and the 
return on these reserves was the CNB’s most significant revenue item.11
 In their Annual Reports over the 2004-2007 period the CNB describes that 
it attempts to manage foreign exchange rate and interest rate risk on foreign reserves 
based on the requirement that the euro portfolio should not record a loss (in absolute 
terms and relative to an unspecified benchmark portfolio) in any moving twelve-month 
 
                                                 




period (the dollar portfolio criteria is that it not record a loss in any moving 36-month 
period).  Figure 3 shows the evolution of the CZK-EUR rate from 1999 through the end 
of 2008.  Over most of this period the koruna steadily appreciated against the euro.  It is 
in this context that the CNB decided to sell euro-denominated reserve assets beginning in 
2004. 
 While the CNB decision to sell euro-denominated reserves is documented 
in their Annual Reports starting in 2004 as well as IMF Article IV consultation reports, 
we were unable to find any publicly released detail on the implementation of this policy, 
in terms of the amount of reserves to be sold or the timing of the sales.  The transaction 
data we obtained from the CNB indicates no discernable patterns of sales in terms of days 
of the week, time of day, or amounts in the first three years of our sample.  We 
consequently describe the reserve sales in this period as belonging to a discretionary 
regime.  Reserve sales occur on every business day by mid-2007, in three equal sized 
transactions, for identical amounts.  The only unpredictable aspect of sales in this period 
is the intra-day timing of the three transactions.  We describe reserve sales in this 
subperiod as rules-based. 
 The koruna’s appreciation trend briefly reversed in the first half of 2007.  
The use of the koruna as a funding currency for carry trade operations can explain most 
of this turnaround.  The ECB started tightening monetary policy in 2006 and relatively 
low interest rates in the Czech Republic led investors to borrow in koruna to finance the 
purchase of debt instruments in higher-yielding currencies (such as the Icelandic krona).  
In mid-2007 the CNB responded by tightening monetary policy, resulting in an 
unwinding of the koruna carry trade by mid-August.  It is worth noting that the CNB 
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continued to sell euro-denominated reserves under the rules-based regime during this 
brief period of koruna depreciation.   
3. Data 
The reserve data used in this study cover all CNB transactions over the 1 
January 2004 to 23 November 2007 period. The data is provided by the CNB, and the 
sample period is determined by data availability. The data include transaction specific 
information: the euro value of each sale and the time-stamp to the nearest minute. During 
our sample period all CNB reserve transactions are sales of euro-denominated assets. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the CNB reserve sales data.12
The high-frequency CZK-EUR exchange rate data is from GenesisFT, and 
covers the full 2004 to 2007 sample period. The data consists of quotes for the CZK-EUR 
spot rate at the end of every 15-minute interval over every 24-hour period. The rates are 
 Our 
sample includes 498 days with reserve sales, and 1,048 intraday reserve sale transactions. 
The maximum intraday transaction is €7 million in 2004 and the minimum intraday 
transaction amount is €1 million. The yearly cumulated amount of reserve sales ranges 
from €208 million in 2006 to €707 million in 2007.  In percentage terms, relative to the 
total reserve stock, the CNB sales are quite small.  For example, in 2007 the euro value of 
CNB reserves was €23.7 billion, so total euro sales of €707 million amounts to 3.5% of 
the total stock.  Figure 4 shows that the koruna value of CNB reserve stocks fell by 
around 13% over this four year period, this decline in value is due both to the 
appreciation of the koruna and sales of reserves. 
                                                 
12 Given the confidential nature of the intra-day reserve sales, we do not display or describe the data in 
greater detail. 
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indicative quotes posted by traders. We follow Dacorogna, Müller, Nagler, Olsen and 
Pictet (1993) and filter the data for anomalies and bad quotes.13
Consistent with other intraday studies focusing on currency pairs with 
limited trading outside of local business hours (see Fatum and Pedersen 2009), we define 




Czech and Euro-area interest rates, which are used as controls in our 
empirical analysis, are obtained from the websites of the CNB (www.cnb.cn/en) and the 
ECB (www.ecb.int), respectively. Time-stamped Czech and Euro-area macro 
announcements and preceding survey expectations are obtained from Bloomberg. Table 2 
provides summary statistics for the CZK-EUR intraday exchange rate, the interest rates 
and the macro news. 
 As a result, our analysis spans 1,005 trading days and a total of 
41,205 15-minute observations. All CNB reserve sales transactions were carried out 
during Prague business hours, so that they are consistent with our trading day definition.  
While the exchange rate is quoted every 15 minutes, reserve transaction times were 
provided to the minute. We therefore cumulate reserve transactions in each 15-minute 
interval. 
4. Econometric Methodology 
 
In order to take into account the long memory and intraday seasonality that 
characterizes high-frequency exchange rates, our baseline estimates of the response of the 
koruna exchange rates to CNB euro reserve sales follow the two-step weighted least 
                                                 
13 Intra-day transaction prices are not available for the CZK-EUR exchange rate market. 
14 This definition of a trading day carries over naturally to a definition of a weekend, i.e. we define a 
weekend to start at 17.15 GMT+1 Friday and finish at 7.00 GMT+1 Monday. 
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squares (WLS)  procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). Specifically, 
we model the response of the CZK-EUR exchange rate as a linear function of J lagged 
values of the exchange rate itself and the contemporaneous and K lags of the reserve 











0 ...1,εγββ  
where st is the first-difference in logs of the CZK-EUR spot exchange rate. As noted 
earlier, T=41,205. We include 3 lags (45 minutes) of CZK-EUR returns (J=3) based on 
the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria and include prior reserves sales in the 
previous 75 minutes (K=5); we vary the number of time lags in our robustness checks. 
The estimation procedure is as follows: first, we estimate equation (1) by OLS and obtain 
the estimated residuals, tε̂ ; next we model the volatility pattern using these estimated 
residuals. We follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) in using the 
following parameterization:  
(2) 
0 1
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where the absolute value of the residuals in equation (1) proxies for volatility in the 15-
minute interval t, c is a vector of normalizing constants, n is the number of intervals in a 
day (in our case 40), tσ̂ is the one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that 
contains interval t), q is a specific intraday calendar effect, Q is the total number of 
calendar effects accounted for (Q=5, based on the Schwartz and the Akaike information 
criteria), and tu denotes the residuals (assumed to be standard normal). We model the 
lower frequency intraday pattern (the first term after the vector of constants) using 
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realized volatility, and we model the higher frequency periodicity by inclusion of the 
Fourier flexible form (the terms in the parenthesis of equation 2).  
In order to take into account the possibility that volatility is also influenced 
by macroeconomic news, we follow Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), by including CNB reserve sales in the volatility 
equation.   
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline Estimations 
We estimate the baseline WSL regression model over the full sample 
period, 1 January 2004 to 23 November 2007,  as well as separately across the two sales 
regimes, the discretionary sales regime (1 January 2004 to 18 June 2007) and the rules-
based regime (19 June 2007 to 23 November 2007 period).  A positive reserve 
transaction indicates a sale of euros (EUR) against koruna (CZK) and the exchange rate is 
measured in terms of CZK per EUR. Therefore, a negative reserve sale coefficient 
estimate or a negative cumulative effect of reserve sales would imply that sales of euro-
denominated reserves are associated with an appreciation of the CZK vis-à-vis the EUR.  
Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the benchmark estimations of equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. The first column of Table 3 shows that for the full sample the 
coefficient estimates associated with the first, third, and fourth lags of euro-denominated 
reserves sales are significant at either 95 or 90% significance levels, and these 
coefficients are of the expected negative sign (sales of euro-denominated reserves are 
associated with a CZK appreciation). The Wald test of the hypothesis that the (negative) 
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sum of the estimated reserve sales coefficients is equal to zero is marginally rejected at 
90% significance. 
The discretionary sales regime (subsample 1) results shown in column 2 are 
similar to those found for the full sample, though we find that the cumulative (negative) 
effect of reserve sales is insignificant.  These results suggest that during the first three 
years of discretionary reserve sales the CNB was able reduce its euro-denominated 
reserve holdings without adversely affecting the value, in domestic currency terms, of its 
remaining euro-denominated reserves. 
However, this result is reversed in the rules-based regime in 2007.  The sub-
sample 2 results, shown in column 3, indicate that reserve sales significantly impact the 
CZK rate (at the 99% significance level).  Further, the Wald test strongly rejects (again at 
the 99% significance level) that the (negative) sum of the estimated reserve sales 
coefficients is equal to zero.   These estimates suggest that during sub-sample 2 CNB 
reserve sales influenced the CZK rate in the theoretically consistent but, from a policy 
perspective, undesired direction. 
Table 4 displays the results of the estimation of the volatility model 
described in equation (2). Whether we estimate the volatility model across the full sample 
(column 1), sub-sample 1 (column 2), or sub-sample 3 (column 3), our results suggest 
that reserve sales are associated with reduced exchange rate volatility. While the realized 
volatility term associated with lower frequency periodicity is highly significant, the 




5.2 Reaction Functions and Unexpected Reserve Sales 
It is possible that the specific timing of reserve sales transactions - for sub-
sample 1 in terms of intraday timing as well as in terms of the specific days on which 
reserve sales occur, and for sub-sample 2 in regards only to intraday timing – is 
influenced by both the contemporaneous exchange rate movement (i.e. the change in the 
exchange rate that occurs over the 15-minute interval within which a reserve sale is 
carried out) and the recent (lagged) exchange rate movements. Furthermore, a close 
inspection of the reserve sales data reveals that reserve sales transactions tend to be 
episodic both across days and within days, suggesting that current reserve sales are 
significantly correlated with recent (lagged) reserve sales. As a result, our reserve sales 
variable may contain an expected component that, if unaccounted for, will lead to an 
underestimation of the true effect of reserve sales on exchange rates. In other words, 
despite the high-frequency of our data, our study may not be immune to endogeneity. 
In order to control for this potential endogeneity, we follow the daily data 
studies by Humpage (1999) and Namalendran and Naranjo (2000) and the intraday study 
by Fatum and Pedersen (2009).  We first estimate a CNB reserve sales reaction function 
in order to capture the expected component of reserve sales. We then use the residuals 
from the reserve sales reaction function estimation (i.e. we subtract the expected 
component of reserve sales from the actual reserve sales) as a measure of unexpected 
reserve sales.  In this way we can obtain an estimate of the influence of unexpected CNB 
reserve sales on the CZK-EUR exchange rate that is free of simultaneity bias. 
The results of the reaction function estimation are provided in Table 5. The 
table shows that for sub-sample 1, the coefficient on the exchange rate is positive and 
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highly significant, i.e. a depreciation of the CZK increases the odds of seeing a reserve 
sale transaction carried out within the following hour. The positive and significant 
coefficient on lagged reserve sales confirm the observed clustering of sales, i.e. once a 
reserve sale transaction is carried out the likelihood of another reserve sale increases. 
Interestingly, the sub-sample 2 reaction function results are markedly different, 
confirming that a change in CNB sale strategy took place. First, lagged exchange rate 
movements no longer help predict reserve sales, implying that sales are no longer aimed 
at timing the market. Second, while the first lag of reserve sales is still significant and 
positive, the remaining significant lags are negative, suggesting that unless a reserve sale 
is immediately followed by another transaction, the likelihood of seeing more sales 
decreases. These results are consistent with the fact that during sub-sample 2 it is always 
the case that three reserve sales occur on each business day.   
The results of the re-estimation of the conditional mean model described in 
Equation (1) using unexpected reserve sales in place of the actual reserve sales are 
provided in Table 6. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimation results 
that are carried out without controlling for endogeneity (Table 3).15
5.3 Macro News 
 
In order to ensure that the estimated effects of reserve sales are not tainted 
by the coincidental arrival of macro news, we extend our analysis to include time-
stamped Czech and Euro-area macro news. Specifically, we include official 
macroeconomic announcements pertaining to changes in the Czech monetary policy rate 
(CZMONPOL) and surprises in Czech CPI (CZCPIYOY and CZCPIMOM), PPI 
                                                 
15 This is, of course, unsurprising given that the explanatory power, as measured using R-square, is low 
across both the sub-sample reaction function estimations. 
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(CZPPIMOM), industrial production (CZINDPROD), unemployment (CZUNEMP) and 
trade balance (CZTB); as well as changes in the Euro-area monetary policy rate 
(EURMONPOL) and surprises in Euro-area CPI (EURCPIYOY), PPI (EURPPIYOY and 
EURPPIMOM), GDP (EURGDP), and unemployment (EURUNEMP). 
We measure macro surprises as the difference between the macro 
announcement and the preceding survey expectation obtained from Bloomberg.  We 
follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003, 2007) and others by standardizing 
the macro news variables (i.e. for each news variable we divide the surprise by its sample 
standard deviation). Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2003) show that the conditional mean of the exchange rate generally 
adjusts immediately in response to macro news, thus we only control for 
contemporaneous macro news. 16
The estimated results of re-running equations (1) and (2) with the macro 




 The estimated coefficients indicate that, 
with few exceptions, macro surprises exert no significant influence on the CZK-EUR 
exchange rate. Of more importance to our research question, the table also shows that the 
inclusion of macro news does not in any way change the previously reported results 
regarding the influence of reserve sales on currency values. 
                                                 
16 In another set of estimations we include the first lag of macro news as well, to take into account the 
possibility of slower adjustment in this market, and find the results to be unchanged. These estimation 
results are not shown for brevity but are available from the authors upon request. 
17 Due to the relatively short duration of the second sub-sample only a limited number of non-zero macro 




In order to test the robustness of our results, we carry out the analysis using 
a different econometric procedure, a different reserve sales lag-structure, a different sub-
sample demarcation point, and a different trading day definition. Additionally, we 
investigate whether the reserve sales are anticipated by traders by testing for lead 
effects.18
First, the gain in efficiency from the WLS procedure is potentially costly in 
terms of inconsistent estimates if the residuals from the initial estimation of equation (1) 
are improperly fitted in the volatility model described by equation (2). In order to address 
this potential concern we also estimate the baseline model using heteroskedasticity- and 
serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors (i.e. we re-estimate equation (1) using 
HAC errors). The HAC results are qualitatively identical to the conditional mean results 
based on the two-step WLS procedure. 
 
Second, in order to test for delayed effects of reserve sales beyond the 5th 
lag captured by our baseline model, we re-estimate our models with an additional 4 lags 
(60 minutes) of reserve sales included. These estimates confirm that reserve sales are 
only significantly associated with an appreciation of the CZK in subsample 2. 
Furthermore, none of the additional reserve sales lags (lags 6 through 9) are individually 
significant, and a separate test of the hypothesis that the sum of the reserve sales 
coefficients for lags 6 through 9 equals zero is not rejected. 
Third, we change the sub-sample demarcation point. The hitherto employed 
demarcation point of June 19, 2007 is both natural and well-defined because, as discussed 
                                                 
18 Estimation results for the robustness analyses described in this section are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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previously, it is based on when the CNB switched to a rules-based regime of carrying out 
exactly three reserve sales transactions of the same size on any given business day. 
However, since the reserve sales frequency increased substantially by the beginning of 
2007 (although not to the point of daily sales of identical magnitudes), we test the 
robustness of our results by employing as an alternative demarcation point 7 January 
2007. While the overall fit of the model deteriorates slightly when estimated across the 
alternatively defined (and thus extended) sub-sample 2, the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged: sub-sample 1 reserve sales have no detectable influence on the exchange rate 
while sub-sample 2 sales are, on average, systematically associated with an  appreciation 
of the CZK vis-à-vis the EUR.19
Fourth, in order to ensure that the possibility of abnormal trading activity at 
either the beginning or the end of the trading day is not affecting our results we 
respectively shrink and expand our trading day definition by 60 minutes, i.e. we first redo 
the baseline estimations with a trading day defined to start at 7:30am (6.30 GMT+1) and 
finish at 6:30pm (17.30 GMT+1) and, subsequently, a trading day defined to start at 
8:30am (7.30 GMT+1) and finish at 5:30pm (16.30 GMT+1).
 
20
Fifth, we address the possibility that the market anticipates and, therefore, 
systematically prices in the effect of the reserve sales prior to their occurrence by testing 
 The estimation results 
associated with these alternative trading day definitions are qualitatively identical to the 
previously discussed results. 
                                                 
19 We also momentarily disregard any institutional insights and visually detectable data structure  in order 
to test for an unknown break-point (see Andrews 1993). The Andrews test identifies a break-point on 9 
November 2006. When we use this demarcation point to distinguish our two subsamples our results remain 
robust. This is not surprising given that there are only two reserve sales days between 9 November 2006 
and 7 January 2007. 
20 When we shrink the trading day definition two end-of-day reserve sales transactions are excluded from 
the analysis. 
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for the presence of lead effects of reserve sales. Specifically, we add two (30 minutes) 
and, subsequently, five leads (75 minutes) of reserve sales to the baseline conditional 
mean model (Equation 1), and test whether the respective sums of leads (two or five 
leads) are significantly different from zero. Whether testing for lead effects of reserve 
sales across the full sample or separately across either of the two sub-samples, we find no 
evidence of cumulative lead effects. 
7. Conclusion 
 
 Economists have long studied the question of optimal reserve holdings by 
governments.  Foreign reserve stocks have risen dramatically for many developing 
countries in recent years, in large part motivated by the desire for precautionary self-
insurance.  However, one of the negative consequences of large accumulations of 
reserves denominated in foreign currency for these countries is the risk of valuation 
losses.  In this paper we examine the implications of systematic reserve decumulation, 
intended to mitigate valuation losses, on domestic currency movements.  Our findings are 
striking.  We find little evidence that reserve decumulation influences the exchange rate 
when sales are carried out on a discretionary basis. By contrast, our results show that 
when these sales are carried out in a rules-based manner – identical amounts sold every 
business day – a significant appreciation of the domestic currency follows. The economic 
significance of this appreciation is not negligible. The estimates suggest that the 
cummulative effect on the CZK of Czech National Bank euro-denominated reserve sales 
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in 2007 (of approximately €700 million) led to a 4.9% appreciation of the koruna relative 
to the euro.21
 Our estimates of the effects of reserve decumulation by the Czech 
authorities are qualitatively similar to estimates in the literature of the effects of 
intervention in currency markets, even though the CNB explicitly did not intend to 
influence the value of the koruna with these operations.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) 
find that a $100 million purchase by the Fed leads to a 1.6% appreciation of the dollar, 
while Kearns and Rigobon (2005) find that a $100 million purchase of AUD by the 
Australian Central Bank leads to a 1.8% appreciation of the AUD, and a Bank of Japan 
purchase of $100 million JPY leads to a .2% appreciation of the JPY.   
 
It is important to note that the reserve decumulation we study in this project 
occurs over a time period in which the CNB and its currency, the koruna, was not in 
crisis.  Indeed, the reason the Czech monetary authority decided to impliment a 
decumulation strategy in 2004 was because the koruna was strong relative to the 
underlying currencies (particularly the euro) denominating the Czech reserve portfolio.  
Our results are therefore not indicative of what might happen in reaction to reserve 
depletion during a currency crisis. 
While Czech foreign reserve stocks are large relative to other countries with 
similiar per capita GDP, they are dwarfed by China’s massive stock of dollar-
denominated reserves.  Moreover, the potential valuation losses for China if its currency, 
the yuan, begins to appreciate relative to the dollar (something the Chinese government 
has recently suggested it may allow) are enormous.  It is for this reason that it is 
                                                 
21 The coefficient associated with the effect of reserve sales for sub-sample 2 is -72.42(10E6), which 
indicates that a €100 million reserve sale corresponds, on average, to a 0.7% appreciation of the CZK.. 
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interesting to consider what our coefficient estimates would suggest for China if it were 
to impliment the CNB’s decumulation strategy for a fraction of its dollar-denominated 
reserve assets.  On a daily basis CNB euro sales in 2007 were roughly .2 percent of 
average CZK turnover in the euro market.22   Daily average yuan (CNY) turnover in the 
dollar market was $9,153 million in 2007 (which was roughly 5 times higher than CZK 
turnover in the euro market).  If we calibrate China’s hypothetical dollar reserve sales to 
be similar in scale to those by the CNB in terms of the size of the yuan-dollar market, 
resulting in sales of $18 million per day, this decumulation policy would trigger a daily 
appreciation of .02% for the yuan. The annual effect of a years’ worth of such daily sales 
would result in a 4.4% appreciation of the yuan (e.g. the CNY-USD rate would fall from 
6.8 to 6.5).23
                                                 
22 Average daily CZK turnover in the Euro market was $1,902 million in 2007.  See, BIS Triennial Central 
Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2007, 
  These calculations are based on the assumption that the Chinese 
government publicly pre-announces the decumulation policy, that it systematically sells 
dollar assets every day, and that it allows the yuan to appreciate.  On the other hand, if 
China instead followed the initial Czech approach to decumulation, selling reserves in a 
more discretionary manner, our findings suggest that it might be possible for China to 
likewise shed dollar assets without impacting the yuan exchange rate.  Our priors are that 
the likely reaction of markets to a gradual decumulation of dollar-denominated reserve 
assets by China would likely lie somewhere between these two estimates.
http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.htm Statistical Annex Table E.4, pp 66. 
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Table 1                                      CNB Euro Reserve Sales 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total Number of Days  









Total Number of Intraday 





























Cumulated Euro Value  











(a) Data source: Czech National Bank 
(b) Reserve transaction amounts in millions of EUR 
(c) Sample ends November 23, 2007. 
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CZK/EUR Spot Rate 29.51555 1.640642 33.555 26.516 96480 
CZ Monetary Policy Rate 0.000013 0.002669 0.25 -0.25 11 
CZ CPI MoM -0.00000259 0.005273 1.1 -0.5 37 
CZ CPI YoY -0.00000622 0.005426 1.1 -0.5 34 
CZ PPI MoM 0.000000207 0.006519 0.8 -0.8 40 
CZ Industrial Production 0.000292 0.073318 7.40 -6.7 47 
CZ Unemployment -0.0000166 0.001985 0.2 -0.2 26 
CZ Trade Balance 0.537376 84.83538 11212 -5776 44 
EUR Monetary Policy Rate 0.0000311 0.002788 0.25 0 12 
EUR CPI YoY -0.00000311 0.001327 0.1 -0.1 17 
EUR PPI YoY 0.0000207 0.002535 0.5 -0.2 26 
EUR PPI MoM 0.00000415 0.002184 0.4 -0.2 22 
EUR GDP YoY 0.00000316 0.00216 0.3 -0.3 20 
EUR Unemployment -0.00000829 0.002184 0.4 -0.2 22 
 
NOTES: 
(a) All data series run from January 1, 2004 to November 23, 2007.  
(b) The exchange rate series contain a quote every 15-minutes; the macro surprises are measured as the 
difference between the time-stamped announcement and preceding median survey value. Czech and Euro-
area monetary policy rate series measure actual monetary policy changes. 
(c) The intraday exchange rate data is from GenesisFT. The reserve sales data is provided by the Czech 








































































    
Sum of RESSALES -18.90 -8.87 -72.42 
Wald Statistic 3.30* 0.59 7.84*** 
    
Observations 41180 36547 4633 
    
 
NOTES:  
(a) * Denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes significance at 99%.  
(b) Standard errors in ( ) below the point estimates.  
(c) Estimations are defined in Equation (1) in the text, and carried out using 2WLS. 
(d) The dependent variable, DLNCZKEUR, is the first difference of the log of the 15-minute CZK/EUR 
spot exchange rate.  
(e) RESSALE denotes reserve sales of EUR carried out by the CNB. RESSALE is measured in millions of 
EUR. 
(f) Point estimates and standard errors associated with Constant, RESSALE, and Sum of RESSALES are 
multiplied by 10(E6) for readability. 
(g) Sum of RESSALES refers to the cumulative effect of contemporaneous and five lags of reserve sales. 
(h) Sub-sample 1 runs from January 1, 2004 to June 18, 2007; Sub-sample 2 runs from June 19, 2007 to 


























































































































    
2R  0.11029 0.10925 0.069477 
    
 
NOTES: 
(a) * Denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes significance at 99%.  
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(b) Standard errors in ( ) below the point estimates.  
(c) Estimations are defined in Equation (2) in the text.  
(d) The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression defined in Equation (1). 
(e) The independent variables are the constant, a realized volatility measure, reserve sales (RESSALE), and 
trigonometric terms (cosine terms denoted by δ, sine terms denoted by φ). RESSALE is measured in 
millions of EUR. 
(f) Constant and reserve sales point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 10(E5); point estimates 
and standard errors associated with trigonometric terms are multiplied by 10(E6). 
(g) Sub-sample 1 runs from January 1, 2004 to June 18, 2007; Sub-sample 2 runs from June 19, 2007 to 
November 23, 2007 
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Table 5                      Reserve Sale Reaction Function 
 Sub- Sample 1 Sub-Sample 2 
all lags selected lags all lags selected lags 







































































































     
Observations 36547 36547 4633 4633 
R-Squared 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.004 
S.E. of Regression 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 
F-Statistic 6.13*** 17.22*** 1.75** 4.78*** 





(a) * Denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes significance at 99%.  
(b) Standard errors in ( ) below the point estimates.  
(c) Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
standard errors and covariances . 
(d) The dependent variable, RESSALE, denotes reserve sales of EUR carried out by the CNB and is 
measured in millions of EUR. The variable DLNCZKEUR is the first difference of the log of the 15-minute 
CZK/EUR spot exchange rate 
(e) Sub-sample 1 runs from January 1, 2004 to June 18, 2007; Sub-sample 2 runs from June 19, 2007 to 






Table 6                             Exchange Rate Responses to Unexpected Reserve Sales 
 Sub-Sample 1 Sub-Sample 2 









































   
Sum of RESSALES 5.57 -92.49 
Wald Statistic 0.04 3.60* 
   
Observations 36547 4633 
R-Squared 0.09 0.03 
S.E. of Regression 0.00 0.00 
F-Statistic 332.35*** 13.08*** 
   
NOTES:  
(a) * Denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes significance at 99%.  
(b) Standard errors in ( ) below the point estimates.  
(c) Estimations are defined in Equation (1) in the text, and carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances . 
(d) The dependent variable, DLNCZKEUR, is the first difference of the log of the 15-minute CZK/EUR 
spot exchange rate.  
(e) UNEXRESSALE denotes unexpected reserve sales of EUR carried out by the CNB and is measured in 
millions of EUR. Unexpected reserve sales are proxied by the residuals of the reserve sale reaction 
function. 
(f) Constant point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 10(E6); point estimates and standard 
errors associated with UNEXRESSALE, as well as sum of UNEXRESSALES, are multiplied by 10(E11). 
(g) Sum of RESSALES refers to the cumulative effect of contemporaneous and five lags of reserve sales 
(h) Sub-sample 1 runs from January 1, 2004 to June 18, 2007; Sub-sample 2 runs from June 19, 2007 to 
November 23, 2007 
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Table 7                            Exchange Rate Responses to Reserve Sales and Macro News 
 Full Sample Sub-Sample 1 Sub-Sample 2 

























































































































EURPPIMOM 2.26 12.00 -16.24 
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Sum of RESSALES -5.07 5.21 -87.74** 
Wald Statistic 0.07 0.06 4.22 
    
Observations 41180 36547 4633 
R-Squared 0.09 0.09 0.03 
S.E. of Regression 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
F-Statistic 174.65*** 164.29*** 7.55*** 
    
 
NOTES:  
(a) * Denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes significance at 99%.  
(b) Standard errors in ( ) below the point estimates.  
(c) Estimations are defined in Equation (1) in the text, and carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances . 
(d) The dependent variable, DLNCZKEUR, is the first difference of the log of the 15-minute CZK-EUR 
spot exchange rate.  
(e) RESSALE denotes reserve sales of EUR carried out by the CNB. RESSALE is measured in millions of 
EUR. 
(f) Czech macro news variables control for monetary policy rate changes (CZMONPOL) and surprises in 
CPI year-on-year (CZCPIYOY), CPI month-on-month (CZCPIMOM), PPI month-on-month 
(CZPPIMOM), industrial production (CZINDPROD), unemployment (CZUNEMP), trade balance (CZTB); 
Euro-area macro news variables control for monetary policy rate changes (EURMONPOL) and surprises in 
CPI year-on-year (EURCPIYOY), PPI year-on-year (EURPPIYOY), PPI month-on-month 
(EURPPIMOM), GDP (EURGDP), and unemployment (EURUNEMP). 
(g) Constant point estimates, RESSALE, sum of RESSALES, and associated standard errors are multiplied 
by 10(E6); point estimates and standard errors associated with the macro news are multiplied by 10(E4). 
(h) Sum of RESSALES refers to the cumulative effect of contemporaneous reserve sale and the five lags of 
reserve sales 
(i) Sub-sample 1 runs from January 1, 2004 to June 18, 2007; Sub-sample 2 runs from June 19, 2007 to 
November 23, 2007 
 
 
